内容简介

本书为中英双语两本，以硬装盒装形式呈现。它是一部讲述西方哲学发展历程的著作，其雏形为梯利教授在大学任教时的讲义。此次出版，共有中英文两本。具体分为希腊哲学、中世纪哲学、近代哲学三编。往下又划分为自然哲学、知识和行为问题、重建时期、伦理运动、宗教运动、基督教和中世纪哲学的古典来源、经院哲学的形成期、文艺复兴时期的哲学、英国经验主义的开端、欧洲大陆的唯理论、启蒙运动哲学、康德的批判哲学、德国的唯心主义、黑格尔之后的德国哲学、法国和英国的哲学、法对理性主义和唯心主义等二十篇。篇下设章，讲述更为具体。文后附原书索引，便于读者检索细目。中文字数接近七十万，是一部规模宏大的哲学史著作。此次中英文两册一起出版，规模浩大，出版方特意延请业内的两位哲学博士共同翻译打造校准，力求让此选题更加精准、完善，让更多学人、哲学爱好者，一起了解并传播西方哲学。

作者简介

弗兰克·梯利（Frank Thilly，1865—1934），美国著名哲学家和哲学史家，曾先后在密苏里州立大学、普林斯顿大学、康乃尔大学教授哲学和心理学，并于1915年至1921年间担任康奈尔大学文学院院长。著作有《西方哲学史》《伦理学导论》等。

精彩书摘

第一章

早期希腊思想的起源和发展

第一节　希腊哲学史

很少有民族的发展能够远远超出神话阶段，除去希腊，其他民族可能都没有发展出一种真正的哲学。基于这一理由，我们的论述就从希腊人开始。他们不仅为后来所有的西方思想体系奠定基础，而且几乎提出了两千年来欧洲文明研究的所有问题和答案。从简单的神话开端发展到复杂全面的体系，他们的哲学是所有民族提供的例证中的最好例证之一。激励着希腊思想者的独立精神和对真理的爱从未被超越过，也极少有能与之匹敌者。基于这些理由，对于较深的思辨思想感兴趣的研究者来说，研究希腊哲学应当是一件有吸引力、有价值的锻炼。

我们说的希腊哲学史是指在希腊起源并得到发展的理智运动。但是我们不仅应当将希腊人自己的体系，而且应当将那些展现希腊思想特征并兴盛于雅典、罗马、亚历山大或小亚细亚等地的体系包括在内，因为这些体系很明显是希腊文明的产物。

第二节　环境

我们要研究其哲学的这个民族居住在多山的希腊半岛，这一区域的自然特征很适合一个强壮有活力的民族发展。这里有许多港口，有利于航海和商业，为移民到各岛屿及大陆提供了口岸。希腊的殖民地从大陆到小亚细亚海岸，最后到埃及、西西里、意大利南部和赫拉克勒斯的石柱，构成了一条连续的链条；这些殖民地并没有同宗主国失去联系，在和有着不同风俗、传统和制度的民族的积极交往中，他们轻易从中获利。由这些条件带来的令人惊异的经济进步，商业、工业和贸易的发展，城市的兴起，财富的积累和日益增加的劳动分工，这些都对整个希腊的社会、政治、理智和宗教生活产生了深刻的影响，为一个新的、更加丰富的文明开辟了道路。这一自然和人文环境有助于激励理智和意志；它给人们的生活和世界一个更加宽阔的事业，激发了人们的批评和反思精神，促进了独特人格的发展，促成了人类思想和行动各个方面的发展。一个民族生来就具有敏锐的智慧、对知识的热望、精致的美感、注重实际的精力和雄心，这一环境为这个民族磨炼其力量和才能提供了物质资料，让它能够在政治、宗教道德、文学和哲学领域取得快速进步。

第三节　政治

在其本土和殖民地的希腊城邦的命运呈现了某些共同特征：任何地方都是从部族首长专制经过贵族统治进而演化到民主制。《荷马史诗》所描述的社会是一个等级社会，政体形式是部族首长专制。少数人对财富和文化的获取导致了贵族统治形式的建立，随后是寡头政治的建立。随着社会条件的改变，公民阶级（平民）出现并开始夺取特权阶级的领导权。从贵族制到民主制的转变，公元前7世纪和6世纪，那些勇敢而负有雄心的人不断尝试从君主手中夺取权力，僭主制在整个希腊世界得以确立。最后人们自己掌握政权，僭主制让位于民主制。

Preface to the Revised Edition

THE FIRST edition of the late Professor Thilly’s A History ol Philosophy appeared over thirty-five years ago. Few books in the fields of philosophy or history have maintained undiminished popularity as texts and usefulness as reference works over so long a period. The remarkable vitality of Professor Thilly’s work may be traced to its original conception and execution.

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of Professor Thilly’s approach to the history of philosophy was the objectivity and impartiality of his historical attitude, which escaped the distorting effect of a dogmatic interpretation of historical development. Professor Thilly allowed the philosophers to speak for themselves and, in the conviction that the later systems in the history of philosophy provide the criticism of earlier schools, kept his own criticism to a minimum.

Professor Thilly’s own two major philosophical commitments were to idealism and rationalism, but he did not allow his own philosophical biases to obtrude in his account of the historical figures with whom he dealt. Indeed, if anything, he was frequently more successful in the presentation of historical theories with which he was in disagreement than of those with which he was in sympathy. His idealism was not of the dogmatic Hegelian variety, but was closer to the critical idealism of Kant. Professor Thilly considered mind an indubitable fact whose existence was guaranteed by introspective experience. His idealism was, however, not a subjectivism which denied the external world or reduced it to the status of mere appearance, and his rationalism insisted that experience, or nature, has rational structure and coherence which render it intelligible to man’s rational mind. His was not a dogmatic rationalism of the Cartesian variety which posits innate, self-evident truths, but rather a critical rationalism, which considers the basic truths of mathematics and the underlying assumptions of science and philosophy to be indispensable presuppositions of an intelligible world.

A second feature of the book which explains its sustained success is the sense of proportion displayed in the presentation of thinkers in their place in philosophical movements. Without adopting an Hegelian dialectic of the history of philosophy, Thilly discerned an inner logic in historical development. Individual thinkers were integrated to movements, and the movements in their turn formed parts of a larger historical pattern. His recognition of the inner logic of the historical process did not, however, prevent his giving due recognition to the social, political, cultural, and personal or temperamental factors which influence individual philosophers. Thilly’s assimilation of philosophers to movements was particularly skillful in his organization of the modern period. Bacon and Hobbes were grouped together as two relatively independent figures who, while not properly part of the British empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, prepared the way for it. Descartes and Spinoza were considered together as the founders of continental rationalism, and Leibniz, instead of being included, as was customary, as the third in the triumvirate of rationalists, was introduced after British empiricism as a philosopher of the enlightenment.

A third feature was the clarity and simplicity of Professor Thilly’s style. In discussing with me the composition of his history Professor Thilly told me that the book grew out of a study of the history of philosophy written with no intention of publication, but solely for the purpose of clarifying his own understanding of the historical philosophers and their relations to one another. This clarification which Thilly achieved for himself pervades the entire exposition.